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I. INTRODUCTION
Many corporate managers cater to the preference of institutional
shareholders for short-term stock price performance, even though this is
widely understood to threaten the sustainability of American business.
For these investors, the focus is on quarterly earnings rather than longrun value that may not be reflected in the current share price. Corporate
executives respond by managing the business with an emphasis on meeting quarterly earnings targets. Often this can mean avoidance of expenditures that reduce current earnings and generate payoffs only in the future.
Casualties of short-termism can include a range of investments that
may be necessary to the corporation’s long-run profitability. These include neglected expenditures on capital assets, research and development, maintenance, advertising, employee training, and customer service.
Yet because they reduce current earnings and therefore threaten share
prices, corporate managers are reluctant to make them. This has implications not only for the long-run viability of American business, but also
for its ability to compete in a world that does not necessarily embrace
short investment horizons.
Amidst concerns about the negative effects on long-run value and
competitiveness, one overlooked consequence of short-termism is its impediment to corporate social responsibility (CSR). This oversight is not
surprising because it is entirely possible to be alarmed by short-termism
while remaining uninterested in CSR. Nevertheless, for those who are
concerned about CSR, it is important to pay attention to short-termism
and its negative impact. Like research and development, advertising, and
the like, CSR also requires current expenditures that reduce earnings.
Sometimes these expenditures—on the well-being of key stakeholders or
the sustainability of the environment—can contribute strategically to the
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corporation’s long-run success or might even be necessary for its survival. In other words, they might be important for business reasons. Or they
might be justified on ethical grounds as “the right thing to do” regardless
of their potential to increase future profits. In either case, a short-term
orientation stands in the way. Whether undertaken for strategic or ethical
reasons, spending money to promote nonshareholder interests reduces
current earnings. Even if there is the prospect of a net financial benefit to
the corporation, it will not come to pass, if it does at all, until some future
time. Meanwhile, investors have lost value. Thus, short-termism not only
jeopardizes research and development, capital investment, and the like,
but also impedes expenditures on CSR initiatives. Until investors are
willing to jettison a short-term outlook, CSR seems even less likely than
it otherwise might be. Corporate social responsibility therefore requires
shareholder social responsibility in the form of more patient investment
strategies.
It needs to be noted that this Article is not about “socially responsible investing” (SRI). SRI encompasses the idea that investment decisions
should be made not solely in terms of financial risk and return but also
with attention to “some combination of ethical, religious, social, and environmental concerns.”1 A number of investment funds focus on society
or the environment in their mission statements. Depending on the definition one uses, SRI investing could comprise as much as 10% of the U.S.
stock markets.2 There are important questions surrounding the actual and
potential impact of SRI and its influence on CSR policies, but these
questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
In this Article, Part II examines the short-termism phenomenon,
first from the point of view of investors and then from that of corporate
managers, and summarizes widely held views about the social costs of
short-termism. Part III then shifts the focus to the impact of shorttermism on CSR, a problem that has been largely overlooked, and develops two theories or models of CSR: the “ethical” and the “strategic.” Part
III also explains how short-termism presents a significant obstacle to
both models of CSR, which compounds concerns about the impact of
short-termism on long-run corporate success. Accordingly, it is all the
more urgent to understand the causes of institutional investor shorttermism, a subject that has not received the attention that it deserves. In
Part IV, the Article first examines the pressures that institutions—
particularly public and private pension funds—face to meet their current
obligations. It then turns to competition among institutions for investor
1. Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible Investment and Shareholder Activism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249, 250 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
2. Id. at 252.
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funds, a problem for mutual funds in particular. Finally, the Article
touches briefly on competition among independent investment advisors
and fiduciary duty law as potential contributors to the short-termism
phenomenon. Part V is a brief conclusion.
II. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND SHORT-TERMISM
A. Short-Term Investment Horizons
Institutional investors are the dominant players in today’s stock
markets. These shareholders include public and private pension funds,
mutual funds, insurance companies, university endowments and foundations, and bank trust departments. As a group, they own approximately
three-fourths of the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations3 and around 70% of
the shares of all U.S. corporations.4 For some U.S. corporations, the percentage of institutional investor stock ownership is even higher.5
Many institutional shareholders pursue short-term investment strategies. These investors hold broadly diversified portfolios and buy and
sell frequently in order to realize trading profits. Among all shareholders,
the average holding period for particular stocks is now very short, perhaps as low as five months.6 For short-term investors, the focus is on
quarterly earnings rather than other possible measures of value. Traders
respond to share price movements and are largely unconcerned with underlying company fundamentals and possible differences between current share price and long-run value.7 They are likely to dispose of underperforming stocks rather than take a more patient approach. Brian
Bushee, a widely respected expert on accounting and financial disclo-

3. As of 2010, the figure was approximately 73%, and it is likely to be even higher today. See
MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REPORT: TRENDS IN
ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION (2010), available at http://www.conference
board.org/publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=1872.
4 . John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703436504574640523013840290.html.
5. For Google, for example, the figure is 83%. YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/
q/mh?s=GOOG&ql=1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012, 6:10 PM).
6. Bogle, supra note 4. But see BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, MILLSTEIN CTR.
FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE & PERFORMANCE, ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM
OR PART OF THE SOLUTION? (2011), available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/sites/mill
stein.som.yale.edu/files/80235_CED_WEB.pdf (seven to nine months); Dominic Barton, Capitalism
for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 85, 87 (seven months).
7. Most scholars now reject the idea that current share price necessarily reflects long-run value.
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 64–65 (2012).
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sure, refers to these shareholders as “transient”8 because they come and
go.
Critics argue that short-termism is increasingly the norm among institutional shareholders. John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group mutual fund family, writes that “the folly of short-term speculation has replaced the wisdom of long-term investing.” 9 Another observer of the
short-term approach to investment—and to corporate management—
criticizes its pervasiveness even since the financial crisis. He refers to
this phenomenon as “quarterly capitalism” because of the obsession with
quarterly accounting results.10
Not all institutions subscribe to short-term investment philosophies.
Some invest with the goal of realizing long-term value. Bushee calls these the “dedicated”—patient—investors. 11 Others are passive indexers
who build portfolios that mirror the stock market as a whole and engage
in trading only infrequently.12 Nevertheless, there is broad agreement that
short-termism is widespread in the current investment landscape.13
B. Managing for Short-Term Results
Short investment horizons appear to be a significant cause of shortterm corporate managerial perspectives. Institutional shareholders that
follow short-term investment strategies tend to favor companies that focus on short-term, quarter-to-quarter accounting results.14 These shareholders may also be a source of pressure on those companies to produce
those results.15 One observer notes that “there is now a growing move-

8. Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 326 (1998).
9. Bogle, supra note 4.
10. Barton, supra note 6, at 87.
11. Bushee, supra note 8, at 326.
12. Id.
13. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37
IOWA J. CORP. L. 265, 269 (2012). This article presents a comprehensive analysis of the shorttermism phenomenon and a careful evaluation of possible reform initiatives.
14. Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run
Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207, 213–15 (2001); Francois Brochet et al., Short-Termism,
Investor Clientele, and Firm Risk (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-072, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999484.
15. See, e.g., Samuel B. Graves & Sandra A. Waddock, Institutional Ownership and Control:
Implications for Long-Term Corporate Strategy, 4 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 75 (1990); Michael E.
Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, 5 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4
(1992). For discussion of the literature on this issue, see Dallas, supra note 13, at 302–07.
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ment to examine institutional shareholders critically and systematically
as a cause of the short-termism that drives bad corporate behavior.”16
Corporate law does not require managerial short-termism. Rather, it
accords management broad discretion to use its authority in the long-run
best interests of “the corporate enterprise.”17 Only in one narrowly defined set of circumstances is maximization of share value required,18 and
corporate management can readily avoid this requirement by choosing
not to enter into transactions that trigger it. The primary cause of managerial short-termism is not the law, but instead the demands from shareholders and the effects of other incentives.
Short-term-oriented investors can put pressure on corporate managers to produce short-term results in a number of ways. The specter of
large-scale sell-offs in response to failures to meet quarterly performance
benchmarks is especially important. Most major corporations provide
“earnings guidance” to stock analysts on a regular basis.19 From this information, analysts construct estimates of quarterly earnings performance. If, at the end of a quarter, a corporation fails to meet the analysts’
consensus estimate, institutional shareholders may sell, and share prices
fall as a result.20 Managers generally cannot afford the risk of these share
price declines. Some institutional shareholders may put pressure on
boards of directors to remove senior executives who fail to produce acceptable quarterly results. According to an experienced management
consultant, “[i]f CEOs miss their quarterly earnings targets, some big
investors agitate for their removal. As a result, CEOs and their top teams
work overtime to meet those targets.”21 One executive put it bluntly: “If I
miss the target, I’m out of a job.”22 A recent study supports this claim,
documenting a strong relation between poor stock price performance and
CEO turnover.23 Short of termination, managers also face the risk of pay
16. Ben W. Heineman Jr., Shareholders: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/10/shareholders-partof-the-solution-or-part-of-the-problem/29188/.
17. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). See generally STOUT, supra note 7, ch. 2.
18. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 37 (Del. 1994); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986).
19. Some well-known companies refuse to do this, including Coca-Cola, Ford, Google, and
Unilever. Barton, supra note 6, at 87.
20. See, e.g., Douglas J. Skinner & Richard G. Sloan, Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don’t Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio, 7 REV. ACCT. STUD.
289 (2002).
21. Barton, supra note 6, at 87.
22. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 28 (2005).
23 . Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, Performance-Induced CEO Turnover (Feb. 2010)
(working paper), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~djenter/CEO_Turnover_February_2010.pdf.
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cuts 24 or lower bonuses. 25 Further, since the enactment of the DoddFrank’s “say-on-pay” advisory vote,26 companies whose stock price has
underperformed have been far more likely to receive negative votes than
have over-performing or even neutrally performing corporations.27 Pressure can also take the form of informal, behind-the-scenes engagement.28
Or it can come through exercise of voting rights or use of shareholder
proposals.29
In addition to pressure from institutional shareholders, corporate
managers are also subject to other incentives that encourage short-term
horizons. Executive compensation arrangements typically include a significant equity component in the form of stock grants or stock options.30
This gives managers a personal stake in stock price movements. A record
of consistent earnings performance may also have important reputational
value. One study finds that reputational considerations may be even more
important than bonus concerns. 31 Managers also have an incentive to
boost current share prices in order to deter potential hostile takeover bids
that would threaten their control of the firm. 32 More generally, widespread acceptance of short-termism by corporate management and investors may indicate a “social norm” that leads actors to assume uncritically
that focus on current share prices at the expense of long-term fundamental value is appropriate.33
Although the reasons for corporate managerial short-termism cannot be reduced to a single cause,34 it does seem clear that the managers of
24. Steven R. Matsunaga & Chul W. Park, The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Benchmark on the CEO’s Annual Bonus, 76 ACCT. REV. 313 (2001).
25. For some corporations, a manager’s bonus may be based on earnings targets that are higher
than external analysts’ consensus benchmarks. Graham et al., supra note 22, at 28.
26. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (providing for shareholder advisory votes on management compensation).
27. Joseph E. Bachelder III, Institutional Shareholders and Their “Oversight” of Executive
Compensation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., (July 23, 2012, 9:31 AM)
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/23/institutional-shareholders-and-their-oversight -ofexecutive-compensation/.
28. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the
Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective, 13 J. APPLIED FIN. 4, 10 (2003).
29. Id.
30. Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregory D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in
Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (2011).
31. Graham et al., supra note 22, at 28.
32. Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988).
33. See STOUT, supra note 7, at 113 (referring to “the business world’s own intellectual embrace of shareholder value ideology”); Dallas, supra note 13, at 320–21 (discussing firm “culture”).
34. Individual and firm-specific factors may also be important. David Marginson & Laurie
McAulay, Exploring the Debate on Short-Termism: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 29
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 273 (2008).
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many U.S. corporations are concerned—almost to the point of obsession—with meeting quarterly targets, despite the potential negative effects on the corporation’s long-term value. To a significant degree, this
results from the demands of shareholders. In effect, investors excessively
discount future returns in favor of current share price increases.35 Corporate managers, concerned about share prices for reasons discussed above,
respond accordingly, managing the company’s earnings in ways that
maximize current share price even at the expense of long-term value
considerations. Scholars have referred to this practice as “managerial
myopia,” 36 but investor myopia is also part of the equation. As legal
scholar Lynne Dallas explains, myopia is “the excessive focus of corporate managers, asset managers, investors, and analysts on short-term results, whether quarterly earnings or short-term portfolio returns.”37 The
consequence of this shared outlook is a tendency for corporations to sacrifice long-run value for short-term stock price performance.
C. The Social Costs of Short-Termism
There is an emerging chorus of concern among business leaders and
academics that corporate short-term strategies raise significant public
policy questions. The central issue is the negative effects of shorttermism on businesses’ long-run performance. For example, according to
the Aspen Institute’s Business & Society Program, “boards, managers,
shareholders with varying agendas, and regulators, all, to one degree or
another, have allowed short-term considerations to overwhelm the desirable long-term growth and sustainable profit objectives of the corpora-

35. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, & Richard Davies, Speech at the 29th
Société Universitaire Européene de Recherches Financières Colloquium: New Paradigms in Money
and Finance? (May 2011) (transcript available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Doc
uments/speeches/2011/speech495.pdf).
36. See, e.g., Sanjee Bhoraj & Robert Libby, Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure FrequencyInduced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflicts, and Managerial Myopia, 80 ACCT. REV. 1 (2005); Natalie
Mizik, The Theory and Practice of Myopic Management, 47 J. MARKETING RES. 594 (2010). The
disjunction between managerial emphasis on short-term share price and long-term fundamental
value suggests that at least some companies would be more valuable if there were a change in orientation toward the long term. In other words, there is a “horizon arbitrage” opportunity available to
those who might be in a position to replace current management with a new team willing to embrace
longer horizons. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors
and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148, 148 (1990). Gaining control, replacing management, reorienting the company’s temporal perspective, and then realizing added value from new approaches to
internal investment policies are expensive and risky propositions. They require large commitments
of capital to individual companies in order to gain control of management. This may explain why
there does not appear to be a significant number of investors willing to undertake this kind of project.
37. Dallas, supra note 13, at 268.
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tion.”38 In a similar vein, two concerned observers refer to short-termism
as “a market failure . . . [that] would tend to result in investment being
too low and long-duration projects suffering disproportionately.”39
Excessive focus on short-term earnings can come at the expense of
a corporation’s long-run sustainability. Quarterly earnings are a function
of standard accounting principles. Revenue enhances the bottom line,
while expenses reduce it. There is, therefore, a built-in incentive for corporations focused on short-term performance to avoid discretionary expenditures that reduce current net income. These can include research
and development, advertising, maintenance, employee training, and customer-service expenses. U.S. accounting rules treat these as expenses
that reduce net income.40 Most executives would apparently avoid these
kinds of discretionary spending if necessary to meet their quarterly earnings targets.41 Bushee finds that corporations are likely to cut research
and development expenditures if stock ownership by transient institutional investors is high. 42 Corporations may also resist making capital
investments, even though these costs can be spread over several accounting periods. Crucially, all of these expenditures can be of great importance to the corporation’s long-term success. The pressure to produce
quarterly accounting results nevertheless discourages managers from
making them. The consequence may be stronger short-term share price
performance, but over the long run, the corporation will fail to achieve its
financial potential.
One survey of 401 corporate executives documents the economic
costs of managerial short-termism.43 Reacting to their understandings of
market expectations, chief financial officers believe that quarterly earnings, computed according to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, are the single most important performance metric.44 A steady, predictable record of earnings bolsters share prices and avoids the harsh
consequences of failing to meet an earnings target at the end of a particular quarter. Remarkably, executives are candid in acknowledging that the
desire to maintain share price justifies sacrificing investment decisions

38. ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A
MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009), available
at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf.
39. Haldane & Davies, supra note 35, at 14.
40. Bushee, supra note 14, at 211.
41. Graham et al., supra note 22, at 32, 35.
42. Bushee, supra note 8, at 328; see also Cherian Samuel, Does Shareholder Myopia Lead to
Managerial Myopia? A First Look, 10 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 493 (2000) (looking at institutional
ownership in general).
43. Graham et al., supra note 22.
44. Id. at 5.
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that create long-term value for the corporation.45 Many would be willing
to reject a project with net positive present value if undertaking it would
cause the company to miss the next quarter’s accounting estimate. 46
Hence Porter’s conclusion that “[t]he U.S. system first and foremost advances the goals of shareholders interested in near-term appreciation of
their shares—even at the expense of the long-term performance of American companies.”47
III. SHORT-TERMISM AND CSR
A. What is CSR?
There is no single, generally accepted definition of CSR. Even
among sympathetic analysts, key questions generate controversy.48 There
is disagreement about the role of business in society, the persons to
whom a business should be responsible, the responsibility that should
entail, and so on. Even so, it is possible to sketch the concept’s meaning
in broad outlines.
The “social” element of CSR is the idea that corporations have responsibilities to the broader society. Some have claimed that corporations serve society simply by seeking to maximize financial returns for
investors.49 It is true that attempting to promote shareholder interests can
create employment, financial returns for lenders of capital, valued consumer goods, and business opportunities for suppliers. But there can be a
dark side as well. Profitable corporations also generate social costs. The
company may pollute the environment or exploit workers, especially in
developing countries. Because compensation is not required in many
cases and shareholders enjoy limited liability, corporations may have
economic incentives to disregard third-party effects as long as profits are
increased. This is what law professor Joel Bakan had in mind when he
called the corporation the “externalizing machine.”50
Once one appreciates that large corporations affect the wellbeing—for good or ill—of many people besides shareholders in direct
45. See id. at 34–35.
46. Id. at 37.
47. Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System,
HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 67.
48. Two important general studies of CSR are THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, and TINEKE E. LAMBOOIJ, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND SEMI-LEGAL FRAMEWORKS SUPPORTING CSR (2010).
49. The classic statement of this position is Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
50. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 60–84
(2005).
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and important ways, it becomes apparent that the social dimension of
business activity extends beyond the shareholders to a broad array of
other stakeholders. Specifying the class of relevant stakeholders has
proven to be controversial,51 but the pragmatic definition advanced by
business ethics expert R. Edward Freeman has intuitive appeal, is reasonably workable, and has proved to be durable: a stakeholder of a particular corporation is anyone who “can affect or is affected by the
achievement of an organization’s objectives.”52 These include workers,
creditors, local communities, suppliers, consumers, and those affected by
the corporation’s impact on the environment.
A second key element of most definitions of CSR turns on the distinction between legal obligation and voluntarily chosen conduct. One
might say that obeying the law itself amounts to socially responsible behavior. This might be especially so in situations where a corporation confronts a burdensome regulation that is underenforced such that violations
are unlikely to have negative legal consequences. Compliance would
benefit some nonshareholder constituencies—workers or consumers, for
example—but it would also raise costs and reduce profits. It could be
claimed that compliance in these cases amounts to CSR, especially
where profits that exceed the value of offsetting nonshareholder benefits
are sacrificed.
The notion of CSR as legal compliance offers little value if that is
all it has to say. No one seriously claims that the profit motive might justify violation of the law. It is generally accepted that legitimate decisions
about whether to respect the law should not turn on cost–benefit analysis.53 Even those like Milton Friedman, who insist that businesses’ sole
obligation is to generate profits for corporate shareholders, acknowledge
that corporations should comply with applicable laws and regulations
and honor contractual obligations.54
CSR should refer to voluntary undertakings—voluntary in the sense
of not being required by law—that are designed to create social value in
51. Thomas W. Dunfee, Stakeholder Theory: Managing Corporate Social Responsibility in a
Multiple Actor Context, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 1, at 353.
52. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984).
53. Legal philosophers have offered a number of arguments in support of a general duty to
obey the law. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1985); M.E.B. Smith, The Duty to Obey the Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 465 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
54. Friedman, supra note 49. One influential commentary states, “Even if corporate profit and
shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business: (1) Is
obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law.” AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(1)
(1994).
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some way. This is particularly important to the extent that law does not
currently do enough to protect human rights or the environment, especially but by no means exclusively in developing countries. For advocates of CSR, corporations contribute importantly to social well-being
when they choose to avoid harming people or damaging the environment
regardless of profit.55 More ambitiously, one could argue that corporations have an affirmative duty even in the absence of legal obligation to
contribute in some way to their stakeholders’ quality of life or, more
broadly still, “to further some social good,” at least in those areas where
corporations are in positions to make a positive difference.56
It may be acknowledged, as critics have pointed out,57 that at least
some of what corporations do in the name of CSR amounts to little more
than public relations maneuvers—“greenwashing”—designed to respond
to pressures from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), activists, and
consumers for responsible behavior. While recognizing that
greenwashing occurs and provides little social value, it is also important
to see that corporations have the capacity to do much more than that.
Many companies have voluntarily undertaken important initiatives in
areas such as improvement of working conditions and reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. The idea of CSR encompasses these kinds of
meaningful activities without claiming that all that passes for CSR creates significant value.
B. Ethical CSR
Given the lack of an agreed definition of CSR, it comes as no surprise that there are several different models or theories of CSR.58 The
various theories are in turn derived from a range of different normative

55. See, e.g., John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible
Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 946, 951
(2007). In the language of economics, this can be referred to as a duty to internalize the corporation’s externalities. See, e.g., Andrew Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost: The Real Meaning of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 221 (2011); Beate Sjåfjell, Internalizing Externalities in EU Law: Why Neither Corporate Governance nor Corporate Social Responsibility
Provides the Answers, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 977 (2009).
56. See, e.g., Abagail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 117 (2001).
57. See, e.g., Steven D. Lydenberg, Envisioning Socially Responsible Investing: A Model for
2006, J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP, Autumn 2002, at 57.
58 . See, e.g., Domènec Melé, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 47. For alternative views, see
Aviva Geva, Three Models of Corporate Social Responsibility: Interrelationships Between Theory,
Research, and Practice, 113 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2008); Min-Dong Paul Lee, A Review of the
Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its Evolutionary Path and the Road Ahead, 10 INT’L. J.
MGMT. REV. 53 (2008).
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imperatives.59 At a general level, it is helpful to talk about two different
models or theories of CSR: the ethical and the strategic.60
The ethical model of CSR asserts that the corporation’s management should attend to the interests of nonshareholder constituencies as
well as to those of the shareholders. In other words, this theory rejects
the shareholder-primacy conception of corporate purpose and management responsibility.61 Instead of asserting that the corporation should be
managed with primary regard for the shareholders’ interest in profit maximization, this model defines fiduciary obligation in more expansive,
pluralistic terms.
Thinking of CSR in terms of duties owed to all the corporation’s
stakeholders is often assumed to necessitate “trade-offs” or “zero-sum”
choices. It is generally taken for granted—often, though not necessarily,
with justification—that the interests of nonshareholders conflict with
those of shareholders. So, if management acts in the interest of some
nonshareholder constituency, it is assumed that corporate profits are reduced accordingly, and shareholder wealth is thereby diminished. For
example, management may decide to install expensive new equipment to
reduce air pollution, even though it is not legally required to do so. The
public stands to benefit, but the added expense will reduce corporate
profits. Certainly, one hears this complaint from partisans of shareholder
primacy, who insist that CSR comes at the shareholders’ expense and is
illegitimate for that reason.62
The flip side of this coin is that acting in the interests of shareholders by seeking to maximize profits will often come at the expense of
nonshareholders. For example, faced with a plant that is losing money,
management may have to decide between closing it, which would be bad
for workers, suppliers, and the local community, or keeping it going,
which would be bad for shareholders. Or it may decide not to undertake
recycling or emissions-reduction programs in order to save costs. In cases like these, decisions in favor of shareholder interests will have a negative impact on nonshareholder stakeholders.
CSR rejects the idea that these questions should necessarily be decided in the interests of the shareholders, but complex allocation questions are embedded here. Under what circumstances might management
59 . One analysis identifies four: instrumental, political, integrative, and ethical. Elisabet
Garriga & Domènec Melé, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory, 53 J.
BUS. ETHICS 51 (2004).
60. See generally David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011). In that article, I refer to these theories as the “constituency” and “sustainability” models. Id. at 525, 530.
61. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998).
62. For the classic statement of this position, see Friedman, supra note 49.
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of the corporation legitimately prefer shareholder interests over those of
other stakeholders? Shareholders being stakeholders as well, it is surely
unsatisfactory to claim that shareholders must always lose. And what
about cases in which there are conflicts of interest among nonshareholder
constituencies? How are choices to be made? As of yet, stakeholder theory does not offer clear answers to these questions.63
Even so, the stakeholder approach to CSR has value primarily because it rejects the narrow notion of corporate purpose that would focus
first and foremost on shareholder wealth maximization. Instead, it asserts
a broader conception that sees corporations as actors in society that are
responsible for the consequences of their actions. The complexities of
this problem cannot command definitive ex ante resolutions, but CSR
denies that this should be a basis for refusing to insist on corporate accountability.
From the shareholders’ perspective, the idea of CSR as requiring
balancing of stakeholder interests might be thought of as charity. As far
as the shareholders are concerned, it is as if management has made a gift
of the corporation’s assets. The value of the shareholders’ equity declines, and they receive nothing in return. Shareholders might therefore
call this approach to CSR the “philanthropic” model. They might also
label it an illegitimate wealth transfer—from the shareholders to the benefited stakeholder group.
Other stakeholders would see the matter differently. For them, the
issue is not whether management might choose to confer gratuitous benefits out of charitable motives, but whether there is an obligation to confer
these benefits in appropriate cases. Scholars primarily in the field of
business ethics have developed a number of normative theories that can
ground these obligations. 64 For this reason, the term ethical CSR 65 is
more appropriate when referring to stakeholder theories that argue for a
balancing of shareholder and nonshareholder interests. 66 This captures
the idea of moral obligation that may exist independently of law.

63. See Dunfee, supra note 51.
64 . For a brief summary with references, see SUZANNE BENN & DIANNE BOLTON, KEY
CONCEPTS IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 13–17 (2011).
65. For a discussion of various versions of ethical CSR and their normative foundations, see
Garriga & Melé, supra note 59, at 60–62.
66. A stakeholder balancing or multifiduciary approach to corporate management can also be
justified on efficiency grounds, without reference to CSR, as being necessary to encourage employees and other nonshareholders to make firm-specific investments in the firm. See Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
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C. Strategic CSR
From a shareholder-primacy perspective, ethical CSR is inherently
problematic. This is because of the assumption that regard for
nonshareholder interests comes at the expense of the shareholders. Zerosum trade-offs are assumed to be inevitable once management deviates
from commitment to shareholder wealth maximization and turns instead
to stakeholder balancing.
A strategic model of CSR avoids this objection by insisting that
business decisions that confer benefits on nonshareholder constituencies
have the potential to enhance corporate profits and shareholder wealth.67
Strategic CSR is thus instrumental in the sense that it is undertaken to
promote the interests of shareholders rather than out of a sense of ethical
obligation to the stakeholder constituency that receives the benefit.68 This
is, therefore, an instance of the “business case” for CSR.69
Strategic CSR asserts that a long-term sustainability orientation requires that management nurture its relationships with key stakeholders,
including workers, customers, suppliers, and the communities in which
production is located. The company’s future depends on the long-range
well-being of these people and the durability of its relationships with
them. Business strategy theorists Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer
provide several illustrations of companies that have invested heavily in
stakeholder relationships to strengthen the company’s future financial
prospects.70 For example, a corporation may invest in transportation infrastructure in an underdeveloped market to facilitate increases in agricultural production that will in turn generate increased demand for the
corporation’s fertilizer products. Increased production will mean better
incomes for farmers as well as increased sales for the corporation. Or a
corporation seeking to increase its access to dairy products might make
substantial investments in well-drilling and irrigation, refrigeration, veterinary medicine, and training for animal husbandry in a new production
location. The corporation benefits from increased supply and product

67. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78. I term this the
“sustainability” model because an important aspect is the long-run sustainability of the corporation.
Because that term can also refer to environmental sustainability, I use the term strategic here instead
to avoid ambiguity. See Millon, supra note 60.
68. See Garriga & Melé, supra note 59, at 53–55.
69. For a general discussion of various business case justifications for CSR, see Elizabeth C.
Kurucz et al., The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 83.
70. For these and other examples, see Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared
Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 62; Porter & Kramer, supra note 67, at 89–90.
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quality, while the dairy farmers enjoy better living standards. Or, a third
example, a corporation might spend heavily on improving employee
health through lifestyle training and antismoking programs. The company realizes large savings in health care costs and enhanced employee
loyalty and productivity, while the workforce experiences better health.
In each of these cases, the corporations choose to create significant benefits for key stakeholder groups (customers, suppliers, or employees) and
therefore act in a socially responsible manner. Even if the focus is on
strengthening the capabilities of key nonshareholder constituencies in
furtherance of the corporations’ own long-range business strategies, the
result for each of these populations is enhanced quality of life.
A strategic model of CSR can also justify expenditures on environmental sustainability, even though they could be problematic under
the ethical model because of the assumed negative effects on shareholder
wealth. This is because a proactive commitment to environmental sustainability (rather than a minimalist, reactive one) can create value for the
corporation as well as for society at large. All corporations concerned
about the long-term future of their businesses must attend to the impact
of their activities on the environment because large-scale environmental
destruction threatens the future of all business. Corporations must also
pay attention to the long-term availability of reliable sources of raw materials. Some industries such as tourism and agriculture may be especially threatened by environmental degradation. Corporations that sell directly to consumers must be wary of the potentially long-lasting negative
reputational effects resulting from disregard for environmental values. A
strategic approach to waste reduction and energy efficiency can reduce
costs, and the development of new eco-friendly products and services
can enhance future revenues.
A number of companies have used process and product-design innovations effectively to reduce costs while also contributing to environmental sustainability. 71 For example, a shipping company may invest
heavily in computer software and new aircraft and hybrid motor vehicles
to enhance scheduling efficiency and reduce fuel consumption substantially.72 A computer hardware manufacturer may develop new uses for
out-of-date equipment to reduce recycling expenses.73 Or a corporation
might develop new products that allow consumers to reduce their energy

71. Ram Nidumolu et al., Why Sustainability Is Now the Key Driver of Innovation, HARV. BUS.
REV., Sept. 2009, at 59; see also Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive:
Ending the Stalement, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 119.
72. See Nidumolu et al., supra note 71, at 60.
73. See id. at 61.
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costs significantly.74 These are examples of companies that have moved
forward proactively to identify ways to reduce expenses and increase
revenues while contributing to environmental sustainability. Although
they may have to spend large sums of money on marketing, research and
development, and new processes and equipment, companies like these
expect to eventually increase their profits and enhance their prospects for
long-term success. At the same time, they reduce their own negative effects on the environment and make it possible for consumers to do the
same.
The standard objection to ethical CSR—that it is bad for shareholders—should not apply to these kinds of business policies. Corporations
do not make these large expenditures, thereby reducing current profits,
out of a sense of ethical obligation, or at least that is not their primary
motivation. Rather, these investments are designed to generate future
returns and thereby promote the corporation’s financial interests. In the
short run, profits are reduced because these initiatives require substantial
up-front cash outlays. But adding in the long-run perspective changes the
analysis because it is expected that the return on these investments will
eventually result in net gains for the corporation and its shareholders.
They are also supposed to contribute to the corporation’s continued existence and profitability decades into the future.
There is significant evidence that strategically motivated CSR can
generate net positive value for corporations and their shareholders. Over
the past thirty years, many researchers have attempted to determine
whether corporations can in fact “do well by doing good.”75 The metaanalysis of CSR scholar Marc Orlitzky critically evaluates existing studies and seeks to correct statistical and research-design inaccuracies.76 In
contrast to earlier literature reviews that have tended to be inconclusive,
he finds that primary studies in the aggregate indicate a positive correlation between financial and social performance.77 Reputational benefits,
improved management learning, and internal efficiencies are identified
as causal linkages.78 It goes without saying, of course, that these conclusions do not imply that adoption of CSR strategies will always yield net
benefits for all corporations.

74. See id. at 61–62.
75. For a critical analysis of this literature, see Marc Orlitzky, Corporate Social Performance
and Financial Performance: A Research Synthesis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 113.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 127.
78. Id.
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One recent study provides particularly intriguing evidence of the financial benefits of CSR policies and practices.79 This study is important
because it supports the idea that strategic CSR may be a source of competitive advantage. Harvard Business School scholar Robert G. Eccles
and his colleagues Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim examined ninety companies that began to adopt environmental and social policies during the early 1990s.80 This set of companies—labeled by the authors as
the “high sustainability” group—chose to develop “a culture of sustainability by adopting a coherent set of corporate policies related to the environment, employees, community, products, and customers.”81 These policies resulted in corporate governance changes and stakeholder engagement and commitment to a long-term performance time horizon. In contrast, a set of ninety “low sustainability” firms did not adopt these policies.82 The members of this group were matched with their high sustainability counterparts with respect to industry sector, size, capital structure,
performance, and growth opportunities.83 Using both stock market results
and accounting measures, the authors found that the companies in the
high sustainability group significantly outperformed their low sustainability counterparts over an eighteen-year period. 84 Coinciding with
Orlitzky’s conclusion, the findings of Eccles and his coauthors imply that
firms committed to strategic CSR “generate significantly higher . . . stock
returns, suggesting that developing a corporate culture of sustainability
may be a source of competitive advantage for a company in the longrun.”85
While there appears to be a compelling business case for strategically motivated CSR, it is important to bear in mind that this model has
built-in limitations that some advocates of corporate responsibility may
find troubling. The strategic approach is based on cost–benefit analysis.
The benefit side of the equation considers only financial benefit to the
corporation, whether in the form of increased efficiency, enhanced revenues, or reputational payoffs. Additional social benefits, even if substantial, are not relevant because the key question is whether the corporation
and its shareholders stand to gain value. This means that corporations
will only invest in strategic CSR if they are confident of net financial
79. Robert G. Eccles et al., The Impact of a Corporate Culture of Sustainability on Corporate
Behavior and Performance (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-035, 2011), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-035.pdf.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id. at 8.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id. at 33.
85. Id. at 27.
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gains, at least in the long run. Accordingly, potentially important human
rights or environmental problems may be ignored because it may not appear to be financially advantageous to address them. Strategic CSR
would not expect expenditures in these cases even if the corporation itself may be a significant cause of the problem and may be well positioned to contribute to a solution. Nevertheless, even though some might
say that strategic CSR does not go far enough, it is important to appreciate that it can have positive social effects. Further, it has the potential to
avoid the shareholder-primacy objection, although it will not necessarily
succeed, as discussed immediately below.
D. Short-Termism, CSR, and Shareholder Social Responsibility
For investors whose goal is short-term financial returns, ethical
CSR is obviously unacceptable. These shareholders do not want to see
corporate management spending money to benefit nonshareholders when
regulations and contracts do not require it. They are likely to insist on
shareholder primacy and reject the idea that management has an ethical
obligation to balance shareholder and nonshareholder interests.
Strategic CSR is also problematic from a perspective that prioritizes
short-term financial returns. This is so even though strategic CSR justifies expenditures on nonshareholders by reference to payoffs to shareholders. The problem is time; the costs and benefits of particular corporate decisions need not and indeed often do not occur simultaneously.
For example, a decision to invest corporate funds in the enhancement of
working conditions requires a current expenditure that will reduce corporate earnings in the accounting period in which it is made. At the close of
that accounting period, shareholders are less wealthy as a result of that
expenditure than they would have been had it not been made. If the expenditure has caused the corporation to miss its earnings target, the share
price is likely to fall. The point of strategic CSR, however, is that this
expenditure is designed to enhance employee productivity and lower
workforce turnover. If those benefits actually come to pass, the financial
payoff to the corporation—and therefore to the shareholders—may eventually exceed the cost. Impatient, short-term-oriented investors may not,
however, be willing to wait for the long-run payoffs. In the words of one
executive, “[a]nalysts and investors are focused on the short term . . . .
They believe social initiatives don’t create value in the near term.” 86
Even when stakeholder benefits can be justified in strategic terms, without resort to claims of ethical obligation, the argument is still likely to
fall on deaf ears in a world of short-term time horizons.
86. Barton, supra note 6, at 89.
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This problem is compounded by the fact that it may be very difficult to calculate expected future financial payoffs. To the corporation, the
benefits of investing, for example, in better working conditions are speculative in the sense that there is no certainty they will actually come to
pass. Beyond that, even taking various possible future scenarios into account, it is extremely difficult to monetize the benefits to the corporation
that flow from better morale, health, and efficiency. Shareholders who
are already skeptical about the value of future profits relative to current
expenses may find an additional reason to resist the proposition.
Corporations are unlikely to pursue CSR as long as institutional
shareholders embrace a short-term investment perspective. Ethical CSR
asserts an obligation to nonshareholders even if that means shareholders
lose value. Investors fixated on quarterly results will not settle for that,
and managers concerned about the costs of failing to meet earnings targets will also want to avoid shareholder losses. Similarly, even if management were to consider spending money on workers’ well-being or
environmental protection as part of a strategy for the corporation’s longterm future, the immediate impact on quarterly earnings would be a significant deterrent. Thus, an overlooked consequence of short-termism is
its discouragement of CSR. Shareholders need to be patient before we
can expect corporate management to do so. Corporate social responsibility may depend on shareholder social responsibility.
IV. UNDERSTANDING SHAREHOLDER SHORT-TERMISM
If it were simply a matter of shareholders changing their investment
horizons and managers adjusting accordingly, one might be inclined to
see this as a relatively minor issue. Arguments about the social costs of
short-termism might gradually gain traction. Legal reforms might discourage short-term orientation at both the shareholder and management
levels by creating incentives for more patient perspectives. 87 Corporations might then find themselves liberated to pursue strategic CSR policies and increase investment in research and development, capital assets,
and other initiatives that require current expense to generate future returns. If investors were to become less fixated on quarterly results, corporations might even have more space for ethical CSR expenditures by
virtue of their discretion to define and pursue long-term goals.
When one looks more closely at the drivers of institutional investor
short-termism, it becomes apparent that the matter is a good deal more
complex than it is typically assumed to be. Important classes of institu87. For discussion of various reform proposals, see, for example, ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y
PROGRAM, supra note 38; HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 6; Dallas, supra note 13.
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tional shareholders face significant external pressures that shape their
short-term orientation. To a significant degree, these pressures seem inevitable. Shareholders’ responses to them are built into their existing
business models. Advancing CSR by addressing short-termism is, therefore, likely to present difficult challenges. This Part analyzes key causes
of institutional shareholder short-termism so that this challenge might be
better understood.
A. Meeting Current Obligations
It is often said that public pension plans are the ultimate long-term
investors. 88 These funds provide retirement income for state and local
government employees. As a group, they own approximately 8% of the
U.S. stock market,89 down somewhat from the 10% stake they held before the financial crisis.90 Some of these institutions are huge. For example, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the
largest U.S. public pension fund, has assets worth over $225 billion and
current obligations to over half a million retirees and contingent liabilities to over a million more.91 Because public pension funds are obligated
to existing and future retirees for decades to come, they are necessarily
thought to have a long-term orientation. To meet future obligations, they
must invest plan assets with an eye toward long-term sustainability.
While pension funds do have obligations extending long into the future, observers have typically failed to note that they also have substantial current obligations. Public pension funds have traditionally been
structured as defined benefit plans, meaning that the employer has promised its employees pension benefits that are definite in amount. These
pension funds must write checks to existing retirees each month in
amounts that are contractually determined. It is therefore up to the managers of these funds to ensure that the plan assets earn sufficient returns
to meet their commitments to retirees.92 This differs from defined contribution plans, in which the employer commits to only a specified contri88. See, e.g., François Derrien et al., Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies, J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=1491638.
89. HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 6, at 8.
90. Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets, 3 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245, 266 (2009).
91. Facts at a Glance, CALPERS (Jan. 2013), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/
facts-at-a-glance.pdf.
92. Pension plans also receive funds from employees and their employers, but investment
returns typically constitute approximately 60% of their revenues. The Widening Gap Update, THE
PEW CTR. ON THE STATES 4 (June 2012), http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/
2012/Pew_Pensions_Update.pdf. Sometimes the number is higher. In 2010–2011, investment and
other income for CalPERS amounted to 80% of total revenue. Facts at a Glance, supra note 91.
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bution toward the employee’s retirement. It is then up to the employee to
invest these contributions so as to meet his or her retirement objectives.
Employees bear the investment risk in defined contribution plans, while
that risk falls on the pension fund itself in defined benefit plans.
The need for large amounts of cash on a monthly basis necessarily
influences investment strategies. To meet their current obligations, public
pension funds have historically assumed an annual rate of return of 8%,
give or take a half point depending on the plan.93 This is still largely true
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis,94 although some plans are considering reducing their assumed rate of return by a point or so.95 If plans
do not attain the 8% target, they may have insufficient investment income to pay their retirees, and they may turn to other sources of funds
such as proceeds from asset sales. Ultimately, the state and local authorities that sponsor these plans—and their taxpayers—must make up any
shortfall.
The pressure to generate strong returns may be even greater in light
of the well-known and much-discussed fact that public pension plans in
the aggregate appear to be massively underfunded. 96 This means that
many plans do not hold sufficient assets to generate the income needed to

93. Mary Williams Walsh, Public Pension Funds Are Adding Risk to Raise Returns, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/business/09pension.html. Historically,
accounting rules have provided a further reason to invest in stock and other potentially high-earning
securities rather than less risky and less volatile assets. Funds have been allowed to discount their
liabilities at the same rate as their expected return on assets, so using an expected return of 8% allows a corresponding discount rate, even though public pension plan claims are essentially risk free,
“making an accrued public-pension plan benefit one of the most secure assets in the world.” Andrew
G. Biggs, The Market Value of Public-Sector Pension Deficits, RETIREMENT POL’Y OUTLOOK, Apr.
1, 2010, at 1, 4, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1991361. Because it
encourages investment in equities, the accounting rule discussed here has been described as a “perverse incentive.” Deborah J. Lucas & Stephen P. Zeldes, How Should Public Pension Plans Invest?,
99 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 527, 527 (2009). The Government Accounting Standards
Board has approved a revision to this rule that would require lower discount rates in certain cases.
For some pension funds, this will increase the extent to which they appear to be underfunded. Lisa
Lambert & Nanette Byrnes, New Rules May Make Public Pensions Appear Weaker, REUTERS (June
25, 2012, 6:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/25/us-usa-pensions-standardsidUSBRE85O01Z20120625.
94 . See Public Plans Database: Actuarial Assumptions, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT
BOSTON COLL., http://pubplans.bc.edu/pls/apex/f?p=1988:17:275542703837601::NO:RP,17:: (last
visited Oct. 26, 2012).
95. Mary Williams Walsh & Danny Hakim, Pension Funds Faulted for Bets on Rosy Returns,
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/nyregion/fragile-calculus-inplans-to-fix-pension-systems.html.
96. See, e.g., Roger Lowenstein, The Next Crisis: Public Pension Funds, N.Y. TIMES, (June 27,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/magazine/27fob-wwln-t.html; Peter Whoriskey, Economists: State, Local Pension Funds Understate Shortfall by $1.5 Trillion or More, WASH. POST
(Mar. 3, 2011, 8:08 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/03/AR20
11030302918.html.
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pay the pensions owed to current and future retirees. The actual amount
of the long-term deficit is controversial,97 with estimates ranging from
$438 billion to over $3 trillion.98
In the current economic environment, it is impossible for public
pension funds to achieve 8% returns on an annual basis. Historically,
over a twenty- or thirty-year period, it could reasonably be assumed that
a diversified portfolio of stocks would earn an average of 8% or more
annually.99 But that assumption may no longer hold. And it bears emphasizing that the 8% figure is an average; one can never assume that it will
be achieved in any given year. Since 2008, it has been impossible to
come close for many public pension funds. Median investment returns
over the past five years have been 3.2%. 100 CalPERS earned 1.1% in
2011.101 Compounding this problem is the fact that since 2008 the economic and political situation has led states and local authorities to attempt to reduce their contributions,102 which results in greater pressure
on fund managers to produce sufficient investment income to meet current obligations.
The burden of meeting their legal obligations to their beneficiaries
creates enormous pressure for public pension funds to generate investment income. In terms of trading strategies, this means a focus on shortterm stock price performance. It also means high turnover rates necessitated by the need to realize short-term price increases in order to obtain
cash. Although their obligations extend far into the future, public pension
funds do not have the luxury of waiting patiently for long-term value to
be reflected in share prices. Nor, with their massive portfolios, do they
have the capability of identifying companies that possess significant hidden value.
Because it is now difficult to realize sufficient income on equity investments, some funds have moderated their reliance on short-term stock
trading strategies. Some public funds are moving portions of their portfolios out of stocks into even riskier “alternative investments” such as

97. See Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored
Pension Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 203, 206 (2009) (concluding that public pension plans are
underfunded by an amount ranging from $.93 to $3.23 trillion).
98. Biggs, supra note 93, at 5.
99. Matt Krantz, Investors Question Wisdom of 10% Rate of Return Rule, USA TODAY (Oct.
17, 2011, 9:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/krantz/story/2011-10-17/rateof-return-for-stocks/50807868/1.
100 . Sam Forgione, Cash-Strapped U.S. Pension Funds Ditch Stocks for Alternatives,
REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2012, 3:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/20/us-pensioninvesting-alternatives-idUSBRE87J0QX20120820.
101. Facts at a Glance, supra note 91.
102. Forgione, supra note 100.
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hedge funds, private equity, and real estate.103 On average, public plans
went from 60% to 50% invested in stocks, with some plans now lower
than that figure.104 Even so, public funds still rely heavily on equities to
meet their cash needs.105 Downward revision of 8% return assumptions
has no impact on short-term cash flows. Some plans are also considering
shifting from actively managed equity portfolios to passive investments
in index funds that essentially mirror the market as a whole. Plans do this
because passive investing saves fees and because it is extremely hard for
portfolio managers to “beat the market.” These are not short-term investments, but pressures for cash discourage large-scale movements in
this direction.
Private, employer-sponsored pension plans face similar pressures
for cash. These investors collectively own approximately 13% of the
stock market.106 The company is on the hook if the plan itself cannot
meet the corporation’s obligations to its retirees, which can mean reduced earnings and a possible decrease in stock price. In extreme cases,
the corporation could default on its pension obligations and even end up
in bankruptcy. Traditional defined benefit pension plans are disappearing. Among Fortune 100 companies, there were eighty-nine defined benefit plans in 1985; by 2011, that number was down to thirteen.107 Even
so, for corporations that continue to bear the investment risk, there is significant pressure to realize cash through short-term stock trading.
Colleges and universities may also find it necessary to pursue shortterm trading strategies. These institutions are often heavily invested in
stock, and they typically use income from their endowment portfolios to
supplement tuition revenues to meet their operating expenses.108 To the
extent this is so, they too are likely to have short investment horizons.
Mutual funds may also have to rely on short-term investments to
meet their obligations. The redemption-on-demand requirement allows
investors to cash out their mutual fund holdings at any time. The need for
liquidity encourages focus on short-term stock performance rather than
long-run value so that gains can be realized when selling is necessary.109
103. Id.; Walsh, supra note 93.
104. See Public Plans Database: Actuarial Assumptions, supra note 94.
105. See Forgione, supra note 100.
106. HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 6, at 8.
107. Brendan McFarland, Prevalence of Retirement Plan Types in the Fortune 100 in 2011,
TOWERS WATSON 3 (July 2011), http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/mailings/TW21621_July-Insider.pdf.
108. Bob Morse, Rise in Endowments May Impact Best Colleges Rankings, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 9,
2012),
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/college-rankings-blog/2012/02/09/rise-in-endow
ments-may-impact-best-colleges-rankings.
109. Jeremy C. Stein, Why are Most Funds Open-End? Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage, 120 Q. J. ECON. 247, 250 (2005).
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In contrast, long-term investments are less liquid even if they are potentially more valuable because current share price is less likely to reflect
underlying fundamentals in the short term.
In summary, various institutional investors face differing pressures
to pursue short-term investment strategies. This is especially so for institutions that rely heavily on investment income to meet their own obligations to others. Pension funds in particular face this challenge, even
though they are often assumed to be long-horizon investors. Given the
importance of investment income and the magnitude of current and future liabilities, it seems unrealistic to suppose that pension funds might
give up a short-term focus for longer, more patient investment horizons.
B. Competition for Investor Funds
Another driver of institutional investor short-termism is competition among mutual funds for investors’ dollars. As a group, mutual funds
own approximately 21% of U.S. equities.110 Mutual fund fees are typically based on a percentage of the total assets under management.111 This
means that the larger the fund, the greater the fees payable to those who
control it. This translates into pressure on those who actually manage
fund portfolios to achieve results that will attract new investment and
that will not trigger outflows of already-invested dollars.
Several studies document that a particular mutual fund’s performance—the return on its assets—strongly influences the flow of money
into and out of the fund. Mutual funds that earn the highest returns tend
to attract the most new money.112 At least for growth and similar styles of
mutual funds,113 year-to-year results are important measures of performance. Investors rely on annual performance reports. Year-end rankings
published by the business press and information services are especially
important.114 Fund performance can also spur movement of dollars out of

110. HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 6, at 8. Prior to the financial crisis, the figure was nearly
25%. Palmiter, supra note 90, at 263.
111. Richard A. Ippolito, Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence from the
Mutual Fund Industry, 35 J.L. & ECON. 45, 47 (1992). A small number of mutual funds use incentive fees based on performance relative to some index. Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Christopher R. Blake, Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds, 58 J. FIN. 779, 780–81 (2003).
112. See, e.g., Ippolito, supra note 111; Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589 (1998).
113. Stephen J. Brown & William N. Goetzmann, Mutual Fund Styles, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 373,
373–74 (1997). Different styles of mutual funds concentrate on different asset classes. Short-termism
is likely to be a feature only of those that invest in equities, as opposed to debt securities, commodities, and currency.
114. Keith C. Brown et al., Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial
Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85, 87–88 (1996).
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lower performing mutual funds into higher performing ones, though the
outflow is not as great as might be expected.115
Mutual funds that seek to attract investors motivated by short-term
fund performance do so by adopting short-term investment strategies
focused on realizing trading profits through relatively frequent buying
and selling. One study identifies these investors as those who are likely
to move their money into or out of a mutual fund according to its shortterm (recent) performance.116 Holding periods of individual stocks and
portfolio turnover rates indicate that investor short-termism correlates
with fund managers’ short-term orientation. 117 Using several causality
tests, the authors conclude that investor short-termism causes fundmanager short-termism, rather than the other way around, as might be the
case if investors responded to managers who pursued short-term trading
strategies.118 Investor pressures may lead fund managers to choose shortterm trading profits even when longer-term investments might produce
more value: fund managers “might be forced to concentrate on ‘shortterm’ investment opportunities, i.e., opportunities that are more likely to
yield positive performance in the short run. . . . [They must] shy away
from the really long term investment opportunities, even if such opportunities have higher expected returns than those shorter-term opportunities.”119
Those who actually manage the individual fund portfolios face the
threat of termination or reduced compensation if their performance does
not measure up. Managers who underperform can be fired. One study
finds that poor fund performance (measured either by growth of the asset
base or by portfolio returns relative to similar fund styles) is likely to
lead to replacement of the fund manager.120 More recent rather than less
recent underperformance tends to be especially significant, indicating
that mutual fund governance mechanisms function effectively to sanction
115. This may be due in part to psychological factors. Investors who bought into a particular
fund based on its positive past performance may experience cognitive dissonance, in effect being
unable to admit their mistake when things turn bad. William N. Goetzmann & Nadav Peles, Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors, 20 J. FIN. RES. 145, 146 (1997). Transaction costs involved in moving out of one fund and into another may also be a factor. Ippolito, supra note 111, at
54.
116. Li Jin & Leonid Kogan, Managerial Career Concerns and Mutual Fund Short-Termism
(Oct. 20, 2007) (working paper), available at http://business.missouri.edu/yanx/seminar/
short_termism_paper_0710.pdf.
117. Id. at 14.
118. Id. at 15.
119. Id. at 21–22. Lin and Kogan’s empirical study validates earlier theoretical predictions that
investor short-termism might produce manager short-termism. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover
Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988).
120. Ajay Khorana, Top Management Turnover: An Empirical Investigation of Mutual Fund
Managers, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 403, 404 (1996).
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fund managers who fail to respond adequately to investors with relatively
short time horizons.121
Fund performance also affects compensation. Especially in larger
firms, current investment performance is an important factor in determining bonuses.122 Performance may be measured by reference to a benchmark (such as a stock index) or to a peer group (such as other mutual
funds of the same style), but managers also report that overall firm performance may be more important than the performance of the portfolios
they manage.123
Because of the pressure to meet annual performance targets, fund
managers will adjust their trading strategies to achieve acceptable yearend results. Thus, for example, fund managers who are below their yearend target halfway through the year are likely to trade aggressively during the second half of the year, assuming greater risk in their efforts to
reach the goals that have been established for their funds. 124 “[B]y focusing so much attention on relative return performance that is assessed annually, the industry may be effectively changing managerial objectives
from a long-term to a short-term perspective.”125
To summarize, mutual funds compete for investor dollars because
their fees are usually based on total assets under management. For most
equity funds, investors respond to short-term performance, moving money in or out of funds accordingly. This creates incentives for fund managers to pursue short-term investment strategies. As long as investors
themselves have short investment horizons, it is hard to see how mutual
funds might be expected to adopt long-term investment policies.
C. The Role of Independent Investment Advisors
Short-term pressures may be amplified when institutional investors
employ independent investment advisors to manage their portfolios.
Some institutions use employees for fund management, but many do not.
In the mutual fund industry, for example, the investment advisor is often
a subsidiary of the investment company, and the fund manager is its em121. Id. at 425.
122. Heber Farnsworth & Jonathan Taylor, Evidence on the Compensation of Portfolio Managers, 29 J. FIN. RES. 305, 319 (2006).
123. Id. at 318–19.
124. Brown et al., supra note 114. This behavior appears to be more likely when managers are
concerned about the effect of performance on compensation. Where job loss is the primary issue,
managers may tend to be more conservative out of concern that high-risk investment strategies increase the possibility of an especially bad outcome. Alexander Kempf et al., Employment Risk,
Compensation Incentives, and Managerial Risk Taking: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry, 92
J. FIN. ECON. 92, 93–94 (2009).
125. Brown et al., supra note 114, at 109.
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ployee. 126 This is also often the case with insurance companies and
banks.127 In contrast, many pension funds rely on independent investment
advisors to manage their equity portfolios.128 These advisors may simply
provide advice to in-house fund managers, or they may take on full, discretionary fund-management responsibilities, making decisions about
investment strategies, asset allocations, and trading.
Many institutions evaluate their investment advisors’ performance
on a quarterly basis, which naturally encourages short-term investment
horizons that in turn can lead to efforts to influence corporate management to generate short-term results. “It is unsurprising, therefore, that
asset managers focus on delivering short-term returns, including through
pressuring investee companies to maximize near-term profits.” 129 According to one expert, “fund managers—even seasoned ones—are under
intense pressure from colleagues and clients if they experience a string of
two to three quarters of underperformance.”130
Exacerbating this incentive problem is the practice of some pension
funds that employ several different investment advisors and evaluate
their performance against each other on a quarterly basis. In effect, a
tournament is created. One study of U.K. pension funds finds a correlation between tournament intensity—the number of fund managers competing against each other—and preference for short-term results versus
longer-term value.131 This study also concludes that fund managers operating in a competitive arena are more likely to disregard or negatively
view corporations’ social and environmental performance when making
stock-investment decisions.132 As discussed above, this is to be expected
when fund managers pursue short-term strategies because social and environmental performance generally requires current expense that generates compensating payoffs only in the long run.

126. Farnsworth & Taylor, supra note 122, at 305 n.1.
127. Id. at 309.
128. Mary Williams Walsh, Adviser Firm on Pensions Is Rebuked, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/business/21pension.html (“Pension trustees often hire
outside investment managers to handle the money in their care . . . .”).
129. Simon Wong, Tackling the Root Causes of Shareholder Passivity and Short-Termism,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 31, 2010, 9:41 AM), http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/01/31/tackling-the-root-causes-of-shareholder-passivity-and-shorttermism/.
130 . Simon C.Y. Wong, Why Stewardship Is Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors,
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L, July/Aug. 2010, at 406, 407.
131. Paul Cox et al., Pension Fund Manager Tournaments and Attitudes Towards Corporate
Characteristics, 34 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1307, 1322–24 (2007).
132. Id.
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In the United States, pension funds often engage consultants to help
them select investment advisors.133 The consultants maintain records of
advisors’ performance to facilitate selection. Competition among advisors for pension fund business is so intense that it raises concerns that
consultants might accept bribes in return for steering pension fund business to particular investment advisors. Even when investment advisors
compete honestly for pension fund business, it is an aggressive process
that emphasizes recent financial performance.134
The point here is that pension funds and other institutions that already face strong pressure to meet their own short-term obligations may
exacerbate their short-term orientation when they employ independent
investment advisors. These actors compete with each other for business.
When their clients are already oriented toward the short term, the advisors have strong incentives to produce those results. While in-house fund
managers are also subject to compensation incentives and the threat of
job loss, it is possible that they may enjoy a degree of security that outside managers do not. To the extent this is so, the short-term behavior of
institutional investors may be intensified.
D. Fiduciary Obligations
A final cause of institutional investor short-termism deserves mention, though it is of relatively minor significance because a relatively
small number of institutions are affected. Bank trust companies, which
own less than 2% of the U.S. stock market,135 are subject to fiduciary
obligations owed to those on whose behalf assets are being managed.
Courts have developed a “prudent investor” standard. 136 Traditionally,
these obligations have been interpreted strictly, and personal liability for
investment losses is a real possibility. As a consequence, fund managers
tend to pursue conservative investment strategies, tilting significantly
toward large capitalization companies with strong earnings and dividend
records.137 Bushee shows that banks, in common with short-term oriented
transient investors, favor stocks of companies whose value is based on
133. Walsh, supra note 128.
134. Graves & Waddock, supra note 15, at 76.
135. Palmiter, supra note 90, at 277.
136. See Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 466 (1830); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 90 (2007).
137. See Diane Del Guercio, The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional
Equity Investment, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1996). Del Guercio finds a significant preference for stocks
that earn S&P A+ rankings. Id. at 39–42. S&P rankings are based on earnings-per-share and dividend records over a ten-year period. S&P 500 Quality Rankings Index: Index Methodology,
STANDARD & POOR’S 3 (Mar. 2011), http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/articles/en/
us/?articleType=PDF&assetID=1245212399111.
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near-term earnings as opposed to long-term, future value. 138 In other
words, the emphasis tends to be on easily ascertainable metrics—
accounting results and share price—rather than less readily quantifiable
long-run considerations.
It is possible that similar fiduciary duty considerations influence
pension fund managers to behave similarly. Most states apply a prudent
investor standard to managers of public pension funds.139 Private pension
funds are subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
which includes a prudent person standard that applies to portfolio management.140 Therefore, as with managers of bank trust fund portfolios,
concerns about legal obligation and personal liability may motivate pension fund managers to pursue investment strategies that emphasize shortterm performance. In contrast, fiduciary duty considerations are less likely to be a factor in the decisionmaking of mutual fund managers because
of the low probability of liability for imprudent investments.141
V. CONCLUSION
Institutional shareholder short-termism can cause corporate managers to prioritize short-term earnings at the expense of potentially greater
long-run firm value. Expenditures like research and development, advertising, employee training, maintenance, and the like reduce net income in
the quarter they are made and produce value for the corporation only in
future accounting periods. A short-term orientation means reluctance to
make these kinds of investments, even though the long-run success of the
corporation may depend on them.
Managerial short-termism also discourages CSR initiatives. Ethical
CSR requires balancing of shareholder interests against those of other
stakeholders. Shareholders fixated on quarterly earnings are likely to find
this unacceptable. Even strategic CSR initiatives, which promise longterm payoffs from investment in stakeholder well-being, are problematic
because of the short-term costs. Here, too, impatient transient investors
are unwilling to trade current earnings for future value.
Because of the large consequences of shareholder short-termism, it
is important to understand its causes. When these causes are examined, it
turns out that institutional investors face significant pressures that constrain their investment choices. Pension funds have large current obligations to their retirees. Mutual funds compete with each other for investor
dollars on the basis of their performance, and potential investors are most
138. Bushee, supra note 14.
139. Del Guercio, supra note 137, at 36.
140. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008).
141. Del Guercio, supra note 137, at 36.
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interested in recent results. Independent investment advisors, competing
with each other for business, exacerbate existing short-term tendencies,
especially for pension funds that often rely on them for their portfoliomanagement services. Fiduciary obligations may also lead some institutions to prefer short-term results.
This is discouraging news for advocates of CSR because it is hard
to see how current investment practices could shift to a patient, long-term
perspective without some seismic changes to the surrounding landscape.
Pension plans must pay their retirees. Public plans cannot expect public
authorities to boost their contributions in today’s economic environment.
For private plans, corporations increasing their payouts would have to
answer to shareholders disappointed in the earnings reduction that would
result. Mutual funds cannot stop competing with each other without radical changes to their business models, and as long as competition persists,
they must cater to investors who are themselves chasing short-term results. CSR, strategic or ethical, depends on a large measure of shareholder social responsibility that is unlikely to occur as long as major institutional investors are compelled to embrace narrow investment horizons.

